Crash

Our hearts and prayers go out to the victims and survivors of the midair collision between PAT 25 and AA 5342. Midairs are the most unpredictable event in aviation and truly the juncture between life and luck. While the most arrogant amongst us believe ‘you make your own luck’ we at D-J defer to Ernest Gann “Fate is the Hunter” and believe that while you do the best you can given the odds, that fate will intervene from time to time and there’s nothing we can do to pre-empt that. The more humble amongst us will defer to God’s will (which is VERY hard by human standards–involving good feelings as well as immense sorrow–but at least promises a word beyond our own where pain is an elected emotion).

There is no question that the airspace surrounding DCA is the most complex in the nation. One only needs to go to Foreflight and read the TFR surrounding this and the difficulty for pilots to follow the rules. The NOTAM itself is many pages long. One which pilots are required to read prior to going into the airspace.

With chagrin, we’ve heard multiple pundits speculating as to the cause. At D-J, our founder is an aviator who’s operated aircraft from OV-10s, through F-111s, F-15Es, 747-400’s, 777s, Citations, Conquests, PC-24’s, and is a current check airman. His words:

“It’s entirely too early as to speculate as to a cause. The best I’m going to do is offer my prayers to the families of the victims. Their relatives are in a better world at this point but that doesn’t ease the pain.

For those that have to be analytical in life, DCA has very difficult airspace with high traffic density. The controllers do their best to shoehorn in traffic–and do a wonderful job–but the layout sucks. There’s high traffic density, difficult airspace to maneuver, and a whole bunch of regulations regarding the airspace. Nevertheless, most pilots operating into there realize the high threat airspace it is an are at the top of their game. Obviously there’s a multitude of training requirements to operate with in the special use airspace, but that really doesn’t do alot of good. Ya gotta be there.

There are helicopter corridors–well known to those with local requirements–but these are not often known to crews operating there. Altitude deconfliction is assumed.

Whether it’s landing south or north, there’s a whole bunch of prohibited areas that need be worked around. It’s a challenging approach in any condition. With a ‘war and peace’ novel written in the NOTAMS. And DCA works a ton of aircraft in and out of there so controller (and pilot) workload is extremely high. They often work departures out of RWY 1 (the long runway) and ask those whose performance characteristics can support it to do an instrumental/visual to runway 1 and circle to 33 which is OK but a challenging approach. Most pilots operating there know that there are helo ops east of the Potomac and might generate a traffic conflict when the circle to 33 is conducted; most hope that tower will keep them clear. And that traffic conflicts stay east of the riverbank.

Ya gotta look at the airfield diagram and approach in Foreflight to get a good understanding; there are alot of threats which any sharp pilot can work around but they’re there nonetheless. If you look at the circling approach from RWY 1 to 33 on the corner–and what we do during a normal circle–it places us in direct conflict with the helo corridor airspace at when an airline pilot would float the turn just a bit. While TCAS might give us a save, it’s inhibited below 900′ such at a resolution advisory won’t try to drive us into the dirt at low altitude–so obviously wouldn’t worked in this case. If a pilot goes a wee bit east of the Potomic–and the helo pilot on the charted route is a wee bit high–they meet where the helo and RJ hit each other. In a way, it’s an accident waiting to happen but didn’t due to the big sky theory and sharp operators and controllers.

From an airline perspective, they run alot of checklists and workload is high during a circling approach–mostly driven from admin tasks within the cockpit. Although we teach to that–and blow off crap during difficult times (prioritizing tasks in the order of prudence, safety, and legality–with the ‘legal’ being last), crews nevertheless seem to run ‘checklists’ regardless of the outside world–and adhere to required callouts. That’s driven into them as a training issue; that It’ll keep them ‘safe’ (or at least from getting fired or getting in trouble with the Feds). There’s a certain loss of SA in running these ‘devotions’ but part of a pilot in the commercial world is in following procedures believing the rule based decision making will avoid all ills. This ain’t true but is what it is. I see it quite a bit during checkrides; a pilot buries his face in a checklist while aircraft control and situational awareness suffers.

The helo crew MIGHT have been on NVGs. NVGs negate depth perception. And make differentiating from different aircraft in range impossible. Regardless, seeing an airplane among a sea of ground lights and planets at night is an extreme challenge. The crew of PAT 21 seemingly wasn’t issued specific traffic instructions (perhaps due to undermanning in the tower) and found AN aircraft they thought they should maintain visual separation from. There were likely several aircraft on the approach to 1 (whether ILS or visual) and any one of them could have been the aircraft PAT 21 thought he (or she) saw. There’s no indication that he (she) saw the conflicting aircraft in the circle, but perhaps there is one he (she) thought he (she) saw. Let’s not forget that the airliner descending from above and in a turn to the left wouldn’t have seen the potential helo traffic, nor would have the helo if it was blocked by structure in the canopy or bow. And in a ‘perfect’ midair the collision threat stays stationery in the windscreen without any relative motion which might trigger the eye. It stays in the same place only gets bigger.

Perhaps the busy, overworked controller assumed visual separation — without a ‘maintain visual separation’ clearance being issued or even a correct handoff of that clearance (i.e. “traffic right one o’ clock 3 miles an RJ at 2000 feet–call in sight” “traffic in sight” “pass behind that traffic”). Some of the radar tracks on the internet show a collision alert which might have been missed by ATC due workload, but I don’t know if these are completely genuine.

I don’t know what was going on in the cockpit of the helo. If it’s like other evals I’ve been a part of there are a multitude of training events which demand ‘ticking the box’ as well as rigorous evaluations of SOP and proper aircraft operation. As such, it’s likely that crew was making sure it adhered to the appropriate regs and procedures–not necessarily making sure it was prioritizing looking outside the aircraft above all else. NVGs add a whole new dimension to the equation; depth perception is all but impossible. While we’d sometimes bomb with NVGs we couldn’t determine closure and a few friends were killed with excessive Vc on a rejoin. You’re closer than you think.

Alot has been placed on the ‘fact’ that the helos are supposed to be below 200 feet on that particular routing. OK. Fine. As a fighter pilot, admittedly not rotary wing, it’s REALLY easy to gain a couple hundred feet when things get busy and while hand flying. I don’t fly helos but I suspect that going from 100′ to 300′ can happen pretty quickly when one is faced with other tasks. I see it when clients are hand-flying the jet all the time and things get busy. Very common. Especially when task saturated with other chores.

Everyone is guessing at this point and I don’t like guessing. But if I add my opinion to the pot the accident was a typical chain of events.

The RJ was operating in a high density traffic area going to a challenging approach. Although it was RWY 1 there was a late switch to 33. It’s likely the crew was reprogramming the FMS to the circle and figuring administrative chores like landing distance and running the approach and landing checklists. This would have diverted their attention from clearing and looking out of the cockpit. And they would have been maneuvering to the left and belly up to threats from the right. I don’t know the experience level of the crew, but I do know many older experienced pilots have chosen to ‘hang it up’ due to the government buffoonery with Covid and DEI. So there’s the possibility they might not have been prioritizing clearing and looking outside (like an old head might do) over doing a checklist.

The helo was on some type of check ride. The crew would’ve likely been familiar with the airspace but dotting the I’s and crossing the T’s and doing admin tasks within the cockpit might have taken priority over clearing the flight path. Having been a part of evaluations and instruction, this takes time away from monitoring the flight path and instruction or intervention increases workload. In the big picture, an airliner close above and to the right–and near–could have been blocked by cockpit structure.

The tower cab was undermanned. This probably happened due to the DEI crap and Covid mandate again–as well as other regulatory encumbrances– where the more experienced controllers chose simply to leave rather than deal with all the silly regs governing their lives.

And spinning up qualified controllers and pilots takes several years. You can’t do it overnight.

The helo corridor is right next to the circling approach to 33 such that a transiting helo flight could be in direct conflict to an airliner who floated the turn.

So I think the dominoes aligned in this case. It’s likely the helo saw departure traffic or traffic on the approach to 1 and called it in sight absent proper direction of ATC where to look. And ATC assumed all is well. The setup was the helo corridors meeting the circle in the corner if the RJ floated the turn or the helo drifted west. And the below 200′ is easily busted by helo crews who can saturate during other tasks. Classic chain of events. To me, the only ‘blame’ is in the bureaucratic encumbrances that resulted in the loss of experienced controllers and experienced airline crews due to the feckless Covid mandates and the increasing regulations that made this a job less worth having.”

At D-J we think our friend is spot on and our hearts go out to all that have been touched from this tragedy. We hope God comforts their pain and hope the “Monday Morning Quarterbacks'” trying to pass judgment can walk a mile in the crew’s (and controller’s) shoes.